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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine how the Greek motto γνῶθι σεαυτόν plays
a central role in Plato’s philosophy in order to show how ethics and knowledge go
hand in hand in his model of παιδεία. The question of self-knowledge is a practical
and theoretical task in life which is developed implicitly in his dialogues, it is for
this reason that i examine some passages of the Charmides, Alcibiades I, Phaedo
and Republic in order to show how Plato discovers the human interiority (Phaedo)
and how self-knowledge is refined and articulated with the tripartition of the soul in
the Republic.
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Although Greek thinkers didn’t develop a clear concept of self-knowledge, this
question is present in theoretical and practical topics of the Greek tradition. Plato’s
philosophy can be explained as a process of self-knowledge and purification, and in
this paper i will try to show the way in which Platonic philosophy is a development
of the Greek expression γνῶθι σεαυτόν1. For this task i will examine some texts of
the Charmides, Alcibiades I, Phaedo and Republic in order to explain that the ques-
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1 The question of self-knowledge in Plato has been studied mostly attending to the early dialogues.
The aim of this paper is to show that self-knowledge is a topic which is presented and developed in
different ways in other dialogues. For the question of self-knowledge in the early dialogues see Annas,
J.: “Self-Knowledge in Early Plato”, Platonic Investigations, D. J. O’Meara (ed.), Catholic University
of America Press, Washington, 1985, pp. 111-138.
tion of self-knowledge is a central topic in his philosophy which is refined with the
development of his own metaphysics and psychology2. The aim of this paper is not
to see how Plato speaks of self-awareness or self-perception3, but rather to show the
role that self-reflection plays in his philosophy. As i will try to explain, Plato’s the-
ory of recollection of the Phaedo and the way of contemplation of the Good in the
Republic are answers to the problem of self-knowledge and the relation of virtue
and knowledge.
1. Self-knowledge as a practical task in life: Charmides, Alcibiades I
in the Charmides Plato tries to clarify the concept of σωφροσύνη and the mean-
ing of the Delphic expression: γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The word σωφροσύνη doesn’t have
a direct translation into modern languages, because the concept expressed in Greek
is very rich in content: self-moderation, prudence, good judgement, excellence of
the soul4. Σωφροσύνη is understood in this dialogue in terms of self-moderation and
inner order, and the connection that Critias establishes with self-knowledge is espe-
cially interesting to examine:
i’d almost be prepared to say that knowing oneself (τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν) is exactly
what self-control is. i agree with whoever it was who dedicated the inscription to that
effect at Delphi, and i think it was set up as an alternative greeting from the god to those
entering his shrine instead of “Be well and happy”. it’s as if saying “Be well and happy”
isn’t an appropriate form of greeting –as if it’s more important to recommend self-con-
trol to one another than that– and so the god doesn’t greet those who enter his shrine
with the form of address we normally use. This, i think, was the intention of the man
who dedicated the inscription: essentially, he’s claiming that what the god is saying to
anyone who enters the shrine is “Be self-controlled”. Like a professional diviner, how-
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2 in this sense i don’t see a big contrast between the early and middle dialogues. From my point of
view we find more refined anwers to the same problems. Penner and rowe have pointed out a high
contrast between Socrates’ moral intellectualism and the Platonic position. See Penner, T.-rowe, C. J.:
“The Desire for Good: is the Meno inconsistent with the Gorgias?”, Phronesis 39 (1994), p. 18. This
contrast is not well justified since they study the figure of Socrates from Gorgias and Meno, two dia-
logues that are not far from Republic. 
3 Self-awareness and self-perception are psychological modern terms related to the capacity of the
human being to be aware of himself. in this paper i prefer to speak of self-knowledge as a broad term
related with self-reflection as a practical and theoretical attitude. See napolitano, L. M.: “Plato and the
Problem of Self-Awareness”, Inner Life and Soul. Psyche in Plato, M. Migliori, L. M. napolitano, A.
Fermani (eds.), Academia, Sankt Agustin, 2011, pp. 151-184.
4 Literally σωφροσύνη means “health of thought”. See Ast. F.: Lexicon Platonicum sive Vocum
Platonicarum Index, vol. iii, Libraria Weidmanniana, Leizpig, 1838 (repr. Cambridge University
Press, 2012) p. 354; Pinilla, A.: Sofrosine. Ciencia de la ciencia, Consejo Superior de investigaciones
Científicas, Madrid, 1959, pp. 23-25.
ever, he’s more ambiguous than that, because although “Know yourself” (γνῶθι σαυτόν)
and “Be self-controlled” (σωφρόνει) are the same (as the inscription claims, with my
agreement), they might be taken to be different (Charmides 164 d-165 a)5.
Critias is sure that the real meaning of σωφροσύνη, which is what Socrates and
his friend are looking for in the dialogue, is an ethical imperative (“be self-con-
trolled”) which consists in acting in a rational and moderate way. in this dialogue,
however, a new element appears in the concept of σωφροσύνη, because it is not
only understood in terms of moderation or excellence in actions, but also as a
reflexive movement of the subject towards himself: to be self-controlled is to know
yourself, and one possesses σωφροσύνη inasmuch as he knows what he is really
doing with his life. it is necessary to clarify that this concept of self-knowledge
doesn’t have for Plato a meaning of direct knowledge of the subject towards him-
self: he is not referring to an activity of self-consciousness, as modern thinkers
speak of self-knowledge6, but it is an awareness of the real value of one’s own
actions7. Temperance (σωφροσύνη) is a knowledge of oneself because it is precise-
ly the acknowledgement of the proper limits: «This is what it is to be self-con-
trolled, what self-control is, and what knowing oneself is: it is knowing what one
knows and what one doesn’t know (τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἅ μὴ οἶδεν)»
(Charmides, 167 a).
Self-knowledge is related with the acknowledgement of the limits of one’s
knowledge, and it may seem strange that Critias places σωφροσύνη in some kind of
epistemological field. it may be noticed, however, that Plato doesn’t use a clear con-
cept of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη8 and, at least in the early dialogues, the main question
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5 For the Charmides i use r. Waterfield’s translation (Meno and Other Dialogues: Charmides, Laches,
Lysis, Meno, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005).
6 See Oehler, K.: Subjektivität und Selbstbewußtsein in der Antike, Königshausen & neumann,
Würzburg, 1997, pp. 24-25.
7 “Gerade der zusammenhang, der zwischen den resten beiden Definitionsversuchen des Charmides
und der Bestimmung des Sich-Selbst-Kennens besteht, macht den Abstand sichtbar, der die
Sophrosyne als Fähigkeit, sich selbst Andere sein zu können, von dem modernen Begriff der Selbst-
erkenntnis. nicht ein Erforschthaben des eigenen Herzens, eine Kenntnis der geheimen Motive des
eigenen Handelns ist mit der griechischen Forderung des Sich-Selbst-Kennens gemeint, sondern die
Fähigkeit, dieses Handeln selbst (auf Motive und Triebfedern ist dabei gar nicht reflektiert) aus der
Warte anderer sehen zu können. nicht im Blick eines allwissenden Gottes, sondern mit den Augen der
Andern soll ich auf mich sehen können. nicht die Gründe, sondern die Grenzen seines Handelns zu
kennen, ist es, was des Besonnenen auszeichnet”. Ebert, T.: Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie
Platons, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/new York, 1974, p. 58.
8 “Auch für Plato hatte der enge zusammenhang von σοφία und ἐπιστήμη mit τέχνη und δημιουργία
tiefere Bedeutung; seine Anschauung vom Wissen des Handwerkers ist gewissermaßen das noch
unverarbeitete Material für sein philosophisches Denken. im Handwerker verkörpert sich für ihn der
Begriff ἐπ ιστήμη mit der in ihm liegenden Problematik, die darin besteht, dass das Wort auf der einen
Seite die Gewissheit, auf der anderen Seite die richtung auf ein ziel forderte. Und diese beiden Seiten
is in which sense there is knowledge in virtue. One the one hand if virtue was a
τέχνη (practical skill), then it would produce something, but, on the contrary, that is
not what happens: virtue is not a productive skill. On the other hand if virtue was
ἐπιστήμη (theoretical knowledge) it should have a particular object of study, but this
is not the case9. A virtuous person is not an expert of something in particular, and
he doesn’t know too much about something. A virtuous person is just someone who
lives a moderate and good life. Σωφροσύνη seems to be some kind of knowledge,
but not of exterior objects, but of the inner life: self-knowledge consists ‒as Critias
says‒ in acknowledgement of one’s ignorance and wisdom.
On the other hand it is interesting to consider that in the Greek tradition a wise
man is not only one who has knowledge, but one who lives in accordance with that
knowledge. Wisdom has a theoretical and practical aspect10. Plato links σωφροσύνη
in this dialogue with some kind of theoretical and practical knowledge which allows
someone to acknowledge his own limits:
Only a self-controlled man, then, will know himself and will be capable of looking to
see what he actually knows and what he doesn’t know. By the same token only a self-
controlled man will be capable of examining others to see what a person knows and
thinks he knows (assuming that he does have knowledge), and whether there are things
which he thinks he knows, but doesn’t really. And no one else will be capable of doing
this (Charmides, 167 a).
A self-controlled man has introduced an inner order which allows him to
acknowledge his own limits and to examine other person’s knowledge. in this sense
σωφροσύνη is a rational disposition of self-control necessary to have a real knowl-
edge. How is this possible? Why is it necessary to live according to reason (virtue)
in order to have a real knowledge of oneself? This practical-theoretical connection
is clearer in the Republic, where Plato establishes the tripartition of the soul, but in
the Charmides he doesn’t seem to give a clear answer. This relation between wis-
dom and acknowledgement of ignorance, nonetheless, has a strong connection with
some passages of the Apology which can give shed some light on understanding
Plato’s conception of wisdom (σοφία) and self-knowledge in the earlier dialogues:
But, gentlemen of Athens, it seemed to me that the poets and our capable public crafts-
men had exactly the same failing (ἁμάρτημα): because they practiced their own arts
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schienen sich auszuschließen: der Handwerker mochte Sicherheit besitzen, dafür blieb er auf sein
Spezialfach beschränkt; dem, der vorgab, eine weitere Weisheit zu besitzen, war leicht zu beweisen,
dass er nichts wusste”. Snell, B.: Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissenschaft in der vorplatoni-
schen Philosophie, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1924, pp. 12-14.
9 See Meno, 99 c.
10 See Hadot, P.: “La figure du sage”, Études de philosophie ancienne, Les belles lettres, Paris, 1998,
pp. 233-254.
well, each deemed himself wise (σοφώτατος) in other things, things of great impor-
tance. This mistake quite obscured their wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπνειν). The result
was that i asked myself (ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν) on behalf of the oracle whether i would
accept being such as i am, neither wise with their wisdom nor foolish with their folly,
or whether i would accept then wisdom and folly together and become such as they are.
i answered, both for myself and the oracle, that it was better to be as i am (Apology, 22
d-e)11.
it is through an exercise of recollection and self-examination that Socrates
acknowledges his ignorance and decides to live with moderation, without pretend-
ing to be what he is not. The connection of this passage with the Charmides points
out that self-knowledge as σωφροσύνη is a practical task in life which consists of
self-examination about what one is really doing in life. Wisdom (σοφία) and folly
(ἀμαθία) are not theoretically acquired dispositions, but rather a practical attitude
towards one’s own limits. in the wise man there is no disharmony between what he
really is and what he thinks he is. The problem of craftsmen and politicians is that
they think they know everything when they really don’t know anything. 
Socrates’ statement of his own ignorance in the Apology points to a level of
knowledge which is previous and deeper than that of the sciences and crafts.
Socrates doesn’t have any science or craft, but he is able to acknowledge his own
ignorance, and this self-disposition makes him wiser than anyone else12, because
people who have science or skills think they know, but they don’t really know any-
thing. Socrates at least is aware of the limits of his knowledge, and he realizes
(ἔγνωκεν) that he is truly worth nothing with respect to wisdom (Apology, 23 b).
Turning back to the Charmides, it is then surprising that the identification of
self-knowledge and σωφροσύνη made in this dialogue is exactly what the god
assigns to Socrates in the Apology. There is no one wiser than Socrates because he
is the only one who acknowledges his own ignorance; this kind of knowledge is pre-
cisely the σωφροσύνη and the proper meaning of the expression γνῶθι σεαυτόν.
Socrates is the man who fulfils the commandment and greeting of the god.
But Plato in the Charmides tries to go further. Critias has said that σωφροσύνη
is self-moderation and self-knowledge, and suggests that perhaps this is a knowl-
edge of good and evil, and Socrates replies:
You’ve been leading me astray all this time! You’ve been concealing the fact that it isn’t
living in conformity with knowledge that causes us to thrive and be happy –or at least
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11 For the Apology i use r. E. Allen’s translation (Yale University Press, new Haven and London,
1984) with some little variations.
12 See napolitano, L. M.: “Plato and the Problem of Self-Awareness”, Inner Life and Soul. Psyche in
Plato, M. Migliori, L. M. napolitano, A. Fermani (eds.), Academia, Sankt Agustin, 2011, p. 168.
that it isn’t the possession of all the other branches of knowledge, but just this one
branch, which is concerned with good and bad (Charmides, 174 a).
The acknowledgment of one’s own limits (one’s ignorance and wisdom) is iden-
tified at the end with a peculiar science of good and evil. Why? Because evil con-
sists in thinking that one is more than what one really is. Bad actions spring from
this foolish disposition (ἀμαθία). Self-knowledge in the Charmides is a practical
inner order which consists acknowledging the limits, and this is a science of good
and evil (ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν13). The word “knowing” here has
more to do with the practical than with a theoretical disposition: one knows himself
when he lives rationally, when he introduces in his own life a rational order (mod-
eration), and this is only possible when one acknowledges his own limits.
nevertheless, up to this point, Socrates and Critias are not able to conclude in
which sense σωρφροσύνη is some kind of knowledge. The statement that
σωφροσύνη is self-knowledge has been explained as a “knowledge of knowledge”,
and then as “knowledge of good and evil”. The problem is that it is not a theoreti-
cal knowledge about other sciences, but a practical-reflexive knowledge14 that Plato
is not able to clarify15. As it happens in many other dialogues of Plato, the topic
remains unanswered16. Critias and Socrates have presented several visions of the
σωφροσύνη without reaching a clear definition. it seems interesting to emphasise,
however, that Plato has explored the connection between self-knowledge and ethi-
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13 in this sense there seems to be a strong connection between Charmides and the Republic, where the
highest knowledge and science is the contemplation of Goodness. See Adamietz, J.: “zur Erklärung
des Hauptteils von Platons Charmides”, Hermes 97 (1969), pp. 55-57. it is also interesting the connec-
tion that Huber establishes between ἀνάμνησις (Phaedo) and self-knowledge (Charmides): the notion
of ἀνάμνησις could be understood as a development of that “knowledge of knowledge”. See Huber,
C. E.: Anamnesis bei Plato, Max Hueber, München, 1964, p. 543.
14 “The Charmides thus implies that knowledge of the good is different in kind from technai such as
those of medicine and navigation. We all want the good and think we know what sorts of thing are
good, but our judgement is generally distorted by our appetites and desires. To know the good is to
know what we ourselves really want. This self-knowledge is achieved not by conventional instruction
but through self-examination”. Stalley, r. F.: “Sophrosune in the Charmides”, Plato. Euthidemus,
Lysis, Charmides. Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum, T. M. robinson y L. Brisson (eds.),
Academia Verlag, Sankt Agustin, 2000, p. 276.
15 McKim suggests that Plato could be trying to show the limitations of the Socratic method. Socrates
wouldn’t be able to explain his own virtue (that is, the declaration of ignorance: whe only knows that
he doesn’t know), and in this sense the Charmides could be seen as a point of distance towards his
master. See McKim, r.: “Socratic Self-Knowledge and «Knowledge of Knowledge» in Plato’s
Charmides”, Transactions of the American Philological Association 115 (1985), p. 60.
16 it is not easy to explain how Plato changes the discussion of the dialogue from self-knowledge to
“knowledge of knowledge” and if there is a connection between self-knowledge and knowledge of
knowledge or they are different questions. See Annas, J.: “Self-Knowledge in Early Plato”, Platonic
Investigations, D. J. O’Meara (ed.), Catholic University of America Press, 1985, pp. 134-135.
cal virtue, and it can be stated that it is only possible to reach a virtuous life in the
way someone introduces rational order, and this rational order is only possible if
someone knows the real value of his actions. The rational and reflexive task of self-
knowledge is a necessary condition to reach virtue. But, on the other hand, i would
like to point out that the connection between self-knowledge and virtue implies also
a necessary good behaviour in order to get to know oneself17. Although this idea is
not explicitly said in Charmides, it is something that appears implicitly in Plato’s
Phaedo and Republic.
Which kind of self-knowledge do we find in Plato’s Charmides? it is neither a
science of the objects of the world, nor a practical skill, but a deeper level of knowl-
edge: is to be aware of one’s reality and the real value of one’s actions and knowl-
edge. This is only possible in the way we examine our own actions18. We know our-
selves when we “realize” what we are really doing: this reveals an indirect self-
knowledge structure in which the subject knows himself insofar he knows better his
relation with the world19.
The problem of self-knowldege appears also in Alcibiades I, where Socrates and
Alcibiades discuss the kind of knowledge a good politician must have in order to
rule the city20. A good politician doesn’t need to have knowledge of practical skills
(107 b), but rather must be able to know what is just (τὸ δίκαιον, 109 c). The prob-
lem arises when they ask themselves what is that kind of knowledge: it seems that
one knows what is just and unjust from early childhood (110 b). Alcibiades doesn’t
know how is this possible and replies that the politician doesn’t have to discuss
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17 it has been object of recent discussion in which way is Socrates position intellectualistic.
Brickhouse and Smith argue that Socrates defended a motivational intellectualism and when we
choose to do something we are supposing (cognitive element) that there is a good for ourselves in that
election. in this way they defend that even though Socrates says that virtue is knowledge there are also
desiderative and appetitive elements that need control in order to achieve virtue. See Brickhouse, T.
C.,‒Smith, n.: Socratic Moral Psychology, University Press, Cambridge, 2010. The same line of inter-
pretation we find in Segvic, H., “no One Errs Willingly: The Meaning of Socratic intellectualism”,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19 (2000), pp. 1-45. Socrates’ moral intellectualism has been put
into context and explained by nehamas, A.: “Socratic intellectualism”, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays
on Plato and Socrates, University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp. 27-58.
18 in this sense Plato’s account of σωφροσύνη is a shift in respect to the sophists: they praised self-
moderation because it could be useful and bring benefits. See Lodge, r. C.: Plato’s Theory of Ethics,
Kegan Paul, new York, 1928, pp. 412-413.
19 See Wieland, W.: Platon und die Formen des Wissens, Vandenhoeck & ruprecht, Göttingen, 1999,
p. 313.
20 There is no treatment in Plato of self-awareness or self-consciousness, which are topics of Modern
philosophy. Plato is trying to answer what is the most noble and essential part of the human being. The
expression αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ is often translated as «the self itself», but that translation brings some mis-
leading connotations. As Gill suggests, it can be better to translate the expression as «itself itself» or,
to say with other words, «what we ourselves are» See. Gill, C.: The Structured Self in Hellenistic and
Roman Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 351.
about what is just, being evident, but try to know what is convenient (τὰ
συμφέροντα, 113 d). Then Socrates states that the problem remains unsolved: one
is not able to say if one has learned by oneself what is convenient or whether it has
been learned from someone else. nevertheless, it accords with each other that what
is convenient (τὰ συμφέροντα), beautiful (τὰ καλὰ), and just (τὰ δίκαια), because
just actions are beautiful and convenient (116 c-d). Up to his point Alcibiades’ con-
fusion reaches its highest point, and he recognizes his own ignorance about the
question (118 b, 127 d). How could he rule the city when he ignores the most sim-
ple notions of justice?
The question can only be solved trying to understand what is «to take care over
oneself» (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 127 e). This is a kind of art or knowledge that
doesn’t help to make any of our possesions better, but rather looks for our own
good, helps to make ourselves better (128 d-e). Socrates is refering to a kind of
knowledge, different from the other arts, that looks for the good of the human being
as a whole. Other arts and sciences aim at a particular good (clothes, shoes, food,
health, etc.), but this kind of knowledge pursues the good of the human being in all
his dimensions. in other dialogues, it is also called “kingly art” (βασιλική τέχνη,
Euthydemus, 291 b) or also φρόνησις that allows to distinguish what is good or bad
in order to be happy (Meno, 88 c-d). This kind of knowledge, necessary to get
virtue, is only possible when we try to know ourselves: «if we have that knowledge,
we are likely to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we
never can» (129 a). Socrates and Alcibiades have reached the main question: what
is really the human being? it is not his body, but his soul, that rules the body: «Then
he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul»
(130 e)21. The soul, however, can only know itself when she looks into her most
noble part:
if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know itself, she must surely look at a soul, and
especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul: wisdom, and at any
other part of a soul which resembles this (133 b).
Self-knowledge turns out to be in this dialogue an inquiry towards the most
divine part of the soul (133 c), but, in any case, it remains unclear at the end which
kind of knowledge is this and how is this possible. nevertheless, in Alcibiades I and
Charmides we find the grounds to solve the problem of self-knowledge and the
knowledge of virtue. if Plato doesn’t give a clear answer at least he has achieved a
possible way to solve it: self-knowledge has to do with a practical disposition in the
soul grounded on the contemplation of something divine we find in ourselves. What
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21 For the Alcibiades I i use W. r. M. Lamb’s translation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1955).
kind of knowledge is this? Plato will try to show an answer in the Phaedo and the
Republic.
2. Self-knowledge as an exercise of recollection: Phaedo
Plato’s opposition between appearances and reality of ideas is a fundamental
point for his vision of man and self-knowledge in the Phaedo. The main question
of the dialogue, if there is life after death, goes hand in hand with very interesting
topics of Plato’s philosophy and, in this sense, this dialogue also deals with the
problem of self-knowledge: in his last hours with his friends Socrates tries to exam-
ine what we really are and how can we be sure of our destiny and the real value of
our actions. Self-knowledge appears as a process of self-understanding22 that
beginns with the recognition of our bodily human condition.
The main problem of discussion in the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul.
Socrates tries to show that the soul is something divine that lives with a body.
Wisdom (φρόνησις, 79 d) appears as a state of the soul in which it finds something
constant and unvarying in a process of self-recollection. The soul reaches his deep-
est truths looking into itself:
Lovers of knowledge recognize (γιγνώσκουσι) that when philosophy takes their soul in
hand, it has been bound and glued to the body, and is forced to view the things that are
as if through a prison, rather than alone by itself (δι’ αὐτῆς); and that is wallowing in
utter ignorance (ἀμαθία). now philosophy discerns the cunning of the prison, to exam-
ine how it is effected through desire, so that the captive himself may cooperate most of
all in his imprisonment (Phaedo, 82 e-83 a)23.
Philosophy allows the recognition and self-awareness of our bad condition, it is
a process of purification (καθάρσις) in which the subject gets rid of the imprison-
ment of appearances and understands his own position in the world. Philosophy can
be understood as a process of self-recognition towards what is really valuable: when
the soul takes notice of the appearances of the world, the soul starts to know some-
thing about his real self. in this sense, self-knowledge is a process of self-recogni-
tion: the real self is the soul, and the main obstacle to look into ourselves are the
bodily appearances, that make the soul look outside of itself. The real philosopher
is the one who is able to recognize the real situation of his soul through a process
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22 it has been often interpreted the theory of recollection as a long process of self-understanding. See
robins, i. n.: “recollection and Self-Understanding in the Phaedo”, Classical Quarterly 47 (1997),
pp. 450-451. in the following pages i would like to point out that this process of self-understanding is
not only a theoretical exercise, but also a practical and ethical attitude in life.
23 For the Phaedo i use D. Gallop’s translation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975).
of self-reflection and purification. For the question of self-knowledge it seems
deeply interesting that Plato uses the word γιγνώσκειν24 referring to the philosoph-
ical process of self-clarification. The task of knowing ourselves (γνῶθι σαυτόν) is a
process of recognition of our human condition. To know oneself is to recognize
(γνῶθι is the imperative form of γιγνώσκειν) what we really are. Although every-
one knows we have a body, only true philosophers recognize (γιγνώσκειν) we have
a soul that needs recollection. Self-knowldege starts with an inner conversion
towards the sensible appearances and a movement of the soul towards itself:
Then doesn’t purification turn out to be just what’s been mentioned for some while in
our discussion, the parting of the soul from the body as far as possible, and the habitu-
ating of it to assemble and gather itself (αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν συναγείρεσθαι καὶ
ἁθροίζεσθαι) together, away from every part of the body, alone by itself (μόνην καθ’
αὑτὴν), and to live, so far as it can, both in the present and in the hereafter, released from
the body, as from fetters? (Phaedo, 67 c-d).
The first step in the process of self-knowledge is to remove the obstacles that
prevent the soul to look into itself. The most real and inner part of us cannot be
aware of itself if the bodily and appetitive desires disturb it the exercise of recollec-
tion. The second step is of being alone in recollection, alone by itself, and in this
sense the ideal of life proposed by Plato is a process of self-knowledge, not in the
sense of self-perception, but as an inner wisdom of what is really valuable for one-
self.
it is necessary to reach a state of the soul in which one is able to recognize that
the simple perceptions are full of deceit (ἀπάτη, 83 a) and it is better for the soul
«to collect and gather itself together (εἰς αὑτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι), and
to trust none other but itself, whenever, alone by itself, it thinks of any of the things
that are, alone by itself; and not no regard as real what it observes by other means»
(83 a-b). We may think that this is obviously an epistemological exercise in order
to get true knowledge, and it is, but i would like to suggest that it is also an ethical
process. Through the main sensible knowledge we are not able to appreciate what
is really valuable for ourselves, and it seems necessary to know what is really valu-
able (in the epistemological and ethical field) through a process of self-knowledge.
Only when the soul can gather itself it is possible to find true knowledge about our-
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24 The term γιγνώσκειν seems to express, as Snell suggests, a kind of knowledge in which the subject
recognizes what it is knowing: in this sense it is interesting that Plato uses γινγώσκειν to say that
philosophers are able to know the truth about our bodily condition. See Snell, B.: Die Ausdrücke für
den Begriff des Wissenschaft in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung,
Berlin, 1924, p. 29. Chantraîne explains that γιγνώσκειν is to know with some effort, to recognize (the
root –σκω indicates to do something with effort). See Chantraine, P.: Dictionnaire etymologique de la
langue grecque: histoire des mots, Klincksiek, Paris, 1968-1977, p. 224.
selves. The interesting point is that Plato introduces in the Phaedo a new psychol-
ogy and vision of man which places the problem of self-knowledge in the theoreti-
cal and practical field. To know oneself is only possible if we leave the opinions and
appearances, and this is also a practical exercise, because the main obstacle in this
process of recollection are bodily pleasures and pains. When the soul is intensely
pleased or pained it considers (ἡγεῖσθαι, 83 c) that those pleasures or pains are most
clear (ἐναργέστατον) and most real (ἀληθέστατον), so that it is through this affec-
tions that the soul lives in a deep ignorance. Pleasure and pain are some kind of sen-
sible judgements that present something as desirable or avoidable and, in this sense,
they can produce a false opinion (δόξα) about reality. The main way to come into
reality is an exercise of introspection, leaving aside pleasures and pains, appetites
and sensible impressions, in order to find something stable and real: it is a process
of ἀνάμνησις.
Ἀνάμνησις is an exercise of recollection and self-reflection in which the subject
examines his inner truths by itself (αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν σκοπ ῇ, 79 d) and achieves his
own reality: one realizes what is truly real and true, and in this sense one under-
stands his position in the world. This exercise of recollection has been commonly
understood as an intellectual activity based on the recognition of some inner truths
we have in ourselves, but i would like to point out that it is not only a reflexive or
theoretical task, but mainly practical. it is only possible to see with the eyes of the
soul when one gets rid of the appearances25: Ἀνάμησις goes hand in hand with
καθάρσις, and virtue is a way of self-purification of bad pleasures and desires,
which are the main obstacle in order to see things properly26. in this sense it seems
that ἀνάμνησις and καθάρσις are two complementary views of the same process of
self-knowledge27: ἀνάμησις is referred to the intellectual process of discovering our
own inner truths, whereas καθάρσις is linked with a practical condition of the soul
that allows intellectual clarification. recollection is not possible without purifica-
tion, and both steps begin with some kind of self-recognition in which the soul takes
notice of its own situation.
On the other hand, the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις and καθάρσις on the Phaedo
shows an interesting aspect of Plato’s philosophy of man: self-knowledge is also
self-freedom, understood as to be free from the appearances, to be able to recollect
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25 See Festugière, A. J.: Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon, Vrin, Paris, 1950, p. 128.
26 See Frede, D.: Platons Phaidon, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Stuttgart, 2005, p. 21.
27 Dorter, for example, made a strong distintinction between recollection and purification. He explains
that in the doctrine of recollection the human soul has the forms within itself, while in the doctrine of
purification the soul strives to contemplate the forms. See Dorter, K.: “Equality, recollection, and
Purification”, Phronesis 17 (1972), pp. 212-213. i think this strong distinction is made upon the sup-
position that Plato had different theories or doctrines in mind, what doesn’t seem to be the case. in
fact, Dorter concludes his essay (p. 218) saying that both doctrines may be compatible, different ways
to approach the way the soul is related with the forms.
over oneself. The real self is the rational soul, and his freedom comes when it is able
to develop properly. in the Phaedo the problem of self-knowledge is placed in the
tension between soul and body28: to be free from the appearances is to be free from
the body. Although this tension will be different in other dialogues, he shows clear-
ly that the self-knowledge process is also a process of inner freedom:
Weren’t we saying a while ago that whenever the soul uses the body (τῷ σώματι
προσφχῆται) as a means to study anything, either by seeing or hearing or any other
sense ‒because to use the body as a means is to study a thing through sense-perception
(τὸ δι’αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι)‒ then it is dragged by the body towards objects that are
never constant; and it wanders about itself, and is confused and dizzy, as if drunk, in
virtue of contact with things of a similar kind? (Phaedo, 79 c).
it turns out, then, that the problem of the body towards self-knowledge is based
on the instability of the objects of sense-perception, so that the soul is confused,
unable to look the things through itself, but instead is only able to look through the
use of the senses. Thus, the proper wisdom (φρόνησις, 79 d) is achieved through the
contact of the soul with the unvarying objects and this act of knowledge is also a
process of self-knowledge29. in fact, Plato is able to say that perhaps this φρόνησις
consists in some kind of purification (αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ, 69 c)
because there is not a clear distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge.
real wisdom is self-knowledge, which is the same as a right appreciation of what
is more pure and truth in our lives: it is a practical and theoretical knowledge at the
same time.
in the Phaedo Plato discovers an inner way of recollection in order to attain
knowledge and virtue. This process of inner knowledge requires a practical and the-
oretical attitude of self-knowledge. The relationship between knowledge and virtue,
as it was seen in the Charmides, has been deepened through the inner way of recol-
lection, which is also a theoretical and practical task in life.
3. Self-knowledge as contemplation of the inner ideas (beauty, justice, 
goodness) and transformation of reality: Republic
it has been explained how Plato approached the question of self-knowledge in
the Charmides and the Alcibiades I without concluding which kind of knowledge is
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28 Plato’s negative vision of the body in this dialogue must be understood taking into account the main
question of the dialogue: does the soul continue living after death? See Frede, D.: Platons Phaidon,
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Stuttgart, 1999, p. 19.
29 Self-knowledge, then, is ἀνάμνησις that through recollection we enter in contact with a level of real-
ity and knowledge which is more genuine to ourselves, previous to our life with the body. See Huber,
C. E.: Anamnesis bei Plato, Max Hueber, München, 1964, pp. 362-364.
present in virtue. Virtue, as a practical and epistemological disposition, seems to be
the deepest kind of self-knowledge, but in the early dialogues he is not able to
answer to the problem of ethical knowledge because he lacks a refined theory of
knowledge and metaphysics. in the Phaedo, as it has been shown, he suggests an
inner way of recollection as a mean towards truth and virtue, and here the main
obstacle to self-knowledge is the body. The opposition between appearance and
ideas changes lightly in Plato’s Republic30. Here the conflict is not between body
and soul, but between three different kinds of motivation31: ἐπιθυμία, θυμός,
λόγος32, and the question of self-knowledge can be approached from his now devel-
oped metaphysics and theory of knowledge. For this question i would like to focus
in one text of the Vii book, where the Platonic παιδεία is expressed as a process of
personal raising:
The soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see
it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order that the
eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must be turned away from
this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate (θεωμένη) reality and that
supreme splendour which we have called the Good (Republic, 518 c)33.
The process of knowledge seems to be an awareness of what is most real, the
Good, a principle that rules the whole reality and that is most pure, truth and beau-
tiful. in this sense, to go out from the cave is to recollect over oneself. We know our-
selves, we understand what is more real and true, when we are able to see things not
with the eye of the body, but with the eye of the soul. it seems that Plato’s theory of
recollection of the Phaedo has been deepened and developed but here the tension
doesn’t come between the soul and the body. it is necessary, as it was in the Phaedo,
a movement of conversion (στρέφειν) of the soul, that should turn away
(περιακτέον) from the sensible perceptions of the world. But in the Republic the
Manuel C. Ortiz de Landazuri The Development of Self-Knowledge in Plato’s...
LOGOS. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica
Vol. 48 (2015): 123-140
135
30 D. Sedley has recently pointed out some continuity between Plato’s psychology and ethics of
Phaedo and Republic. in both dialogues there is a purificatory virtue, real virtue, associated with the
soul’s liberation (Phaedo) or soul’s gaze (Republic). See Sedley, D.: “Socratic intellectualism in the
Republic’s Central Digression”, The Platonic Art of Philosophy, G. Boys-Stones-D. El Murr-C. Gill
(eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 84-85. His thesis is that Plato is always try-
ing to continue and perfect Socrates’ project. in this line of interpretation i suggest that the Delphic
advice (γνῶθι σεατόν), as a main topic in Socrates’ activity, is one of the central features of Plato’s
philosophy.
31 See Cooper, J. M.: “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation”, Reason and Emotion, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp. 118-137.
32 “Conflict of motives ‒a conflict within the soul itself‒ is now fully recognized, and a psychology is
outlined which to a large degree caters for it. no longer is the conflict between body and soul, as in
the Phaedo; the conflict lies rather within the soul itself, as in the Gorgias”. robinson, T. M.: Plato’s
Psychology, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995, p. 43.
33 For the Republic i use F. M. Cornford’s translation (Oxford University Press, London, 1941).
fight in the human soul is between knowledge and opinion, reality and appearances,
reason and desire, and the process of understanding begins with a movement of con-
version or self-understanding. This needs some detailed explanation.
Plato’s tripartition of the soul gives a refined vision of man. Harmony and inner
order is the key that allows the way to contemplation, because each part has its
proper function, and it is only possible to contemplate the Good (which is harmony
and proportion) when there is that inner proportion in the human soul. At the same
time, the process of contemplation starts with some self-recognition in which the
soul clarifies its own situation. Self-knowledge, understood as awareness of what is
most real and true in ourselves (Alcibiades I), comes only when the rational part
commands the appetitive and the passional parts, that is, when there is a practical
and rational disposition towards the Good34. The Good is an object of contempla-
tion, but it is also a rational and harmonious disposition35, and the deeper knowl-
edge of the Good comes when we introduce it in our own lives. The good is that
which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does (505 d). On the other
hand, self-knowledge comes with the ruling of reason over the other parts of the
soul, because reason knows what is best for the soul as a whole and for each of its
parts (see Republic, 442 c). it has been a question of recent debate the way in which
the three parts of the soul are related between them36. Some scholars understand
these parts as different subjects of desire37, whereas others prefer to take them as
different agencies of the same soul38. For the question of self-knowledge it must be
said that the whole soul must pursue the good seeking the way of the rational part
(Phaedrus 256 a-b, Republic 586 e)39. it seems, then, that there is a psychological
and metaphysical centre of volition above all kind of desires (and parts of the soul),
the real “i” that should pursue the good with the help of the rational part. it would
be interesting to examine the way in which this most real part of ourselves is relat-
ed with the rational part of the soul, but this would be another matter of study.
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34 in this sense Plato’s philosophy does not represent a mystic position, although there can be some
analogies with the mystical life. The aim of Plato’s παιδεία is not the mystic union with the ideas, as
it may happen in Plotin’s philosophy. See Friedländer, P.: Platon, vol. i, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin,
1964 [1928], pp. 76-89.
35 “L’ordre et l’harmonie du Gorgias, la mesure, la proportion parfaite du Philèbe, le Tout divin du
Timée, des Lois, du Sophiste même, servent tour à tour, chez Platon, à définir ou figurer ce Bien, stric-
tement indéfinissable”. Diès, A.: Platon. La République. Introduction, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1970,
p. lxiii.
36 See Vallejo, A.: “The Theory of Conflict in Plato’s republic”, Dialogues on Plato’s Republic, n.
notomi-L. Brisson (eds.), Academia, Sankt Agustin, 2013, pp. 192-198.
37 See Bobonich, C.: Plato’s Utopia Recast, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 219.
38 See Price A. W: Mental Conflict, routledge, London and new York, 1995, p. 54.
39 it seems quite interesting C. Kahn’s position, that points out that perhaps it would be better to speak
of a general desire towards Good (Beauty, in case of the Symposium) that is over the rest of desires
and motivational parts of the soul. See Kahn, C., “Plato’s Theory of Desire”, Review of Metaphysics
41 (1987), p. 101.
it seems clear from the exposition of the Vii Book of the Republic that the
human being gets to know his own reality understanding the Good, but i would like
to point out the practical dimension of this knowledge. To know oneself is primary
to introduce order in the appetites, and this order enables the knowledge of deeper
realities. But, on the other hand, this order begins with some self-clarification. As
Plato states in the Vii Book, the main problem of those who have no experience of
wisdom and virtue (φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, 586 a) is that they do not nour-
ish the most noble part of themselves with what is most real and truth (οὐχὶ τοῖς
οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες, 586 b) so that they are not able
to appreciate the real value of sensible pleasures. Self-knowledge is then a process
in which the soul knows better his position towards the Good in the way it under-
stands it better and introduces some inner order. We need some inner order to appre-
ciate the Good, and when we nourish the most noble part of ourselves, we are able
to act better according to this knowledge.
in this sense, self-knowledge is a theoretical and practical task in life. Although
Plato does not treat this idea explicitly there are passages in which he suggests it, as
for example when he speaks of the qualities of the good judge:
To make a good judge, a man must be old. The knowledge of what wickedness is should
have come late in life, not from a consciousness of its presence in his own soul (οὐκ
οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὑτου ψυχή ἐνοῦσαν), but from a long practice observing its evil effects
in the souls of others. it should be a matter of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), not of personal
experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ οἰκείᾳ) (Rep. 409 b-c).
We are only able to know ourselves in the way we act justly, precisely because
the bad personal experience enables us to see the real value of justice. This text
points out an interesting idea of Plato’s ethics of self-knowledge. Knowledge of
good and evil doesn’t consist in a theoretical knowledge, but rather is a practical
knowledge, acquired through one’s own disposition towards good and evil. The real
knowledge of evil is only possible from a good ethical disposition, whereas the real
knowledge of goodness is not possible from a bad disposition. Only a good man is
able to know the real value of things because he has developed a rational soul up to
a point that it is aware of what is really good for himself. We know ourselves in the
way we introduce a practical order that enables us to appreciate and recognize what
is more valuable for us.
The connection between the inner disposition of the soul and the level of knowl-
edge one is able to achieve appears, then, as a central point in Plato’s philosophy,
and this connection is present in almost all the Platonic dialogues. The main prob-
lem of the soul is ἀμαθία, that is, a practical attitude of ignorance and opinion in
which one prefers to seek appetitive pleasures instead of the real good for the soul40.
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Ἀμαθία is not only a state of ignorance, but a foolish disposition towards what is
really valuable, so that the ἀμαθής doesn’t want to exit from this state of igno-
rance41. The problem of self-knowledge, then, is a problem of self-disposition: it is
only possible to look into the Good (that is, the principle that rules reality, what is
most valuable and real to ourselves) in the way one is able to establish a rational
order in the soul, so that the different appetites are commanded by reason. To know
oneself is to contemplate Goodness and to introduce an inner order in the soul
according to that goodness42. Self-knowledge is then a theoretical and practical task
in life: the contemplation of the Good and the realization of this Good in our own
lives43. Plato has found an epistemic ground for the knowledge of virtue (under-
stood as self-knowledge), based on the contemplation of the Good; but, on the other
hand, this contemplation is only possible in the way that the human being intro-
duces order in his appetites and desires. Self-knowledge is a intellectual and practi-
cal process of self-clarification towards what is really valuable in life.
4. Conclusions
i have tried to show that the question of self-knowledge is an implicit central
topic in Plato’s philosophy, that, although is not clearly explained, it goes hand in
hand with the development of his own psychology and metaphysics44. it must be
noticed, however, that the concept of self-knowledge in Plato goes in connection
with the Delphic advice: γνῶθι σεαυτόν, that is, a practical knowledge of our own
limitations. There is not in Plato’s philosophy a concept of self-knowledge in the
modern sense of the word, as “self-consciousness”.
in Plato’s Charmides self-knowledge seems to be an exercise of moderation and
recognition of one’s own limits. it is a practical and theoretical task in life, and the
Manuel C. Ortiz de Landazuri The Development of Self-Knowledge in Plato’s...
LOGOS. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica
Vol. 48 (2015): 123-140
138
41 See Rep. 535 c-d; Laws, 689 a.
42 “Für den Philosophen, der die idee des Guten als die Spitze und den Enheitspunkt der gesammten
ideenwelt betrachtet, und der durch das Wissen des Guten das Wollen und Tun desselben als in unbe-
dingter notwendigkeit bestimmt erachtet, für Platon ist die Befähigung der menschliche Seele zu
absoluter Erkenntnis zugleich ihre Bestimmung zu absoluter sittlicher reinheit”. Bonitz, H.:
Platonische Studien, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1968 [Berlin, 1886], p. 311.
43 in this sense it is interesting that in the Philebus the practical good is the introduction of order and
harmony in the practical life. See Kahn, C.: “Plato on the Good”, Was ist das für den Menschen Gute?,
J. Szaif-M. Lutz (eds.), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2004, p. 16.
44 it might be said, however, that with the development of his psychology and metaphysics Plato seems
to be searching a better explanation of the main topics of Socrates’ thought. i don’t see a great discon-
tinuity between Socrates’ and Plato’s psychology. A developmentalist approach can be found in
Brickhouse, T. C., Smith, n.: Socratic Moral Psychology, University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 193-
247. Against this developmentalist view see rowe, C.: Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing,
University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
problem in this dialogue is how to define this kind of wisdom. The analogy of virtue
with the crafts and sciences makes difficult to explain the kind of knowledge pres-
ent in virtue: it is not a practical knowledge as in the crafts, because it doesn’t pro-
duce anything, and it is not a theoretical knowledge, because it doesn’t have a clear
object of study. Plato seems to be referring to an inner knowledge of good and evil,
a “knowledge of knowledge”, but he is not able to define it clearly. The same prob-
lem appears in Alcibiades I when Socrates and Alcibiades try to understand what is
“to take care of oneself”. Although they notice that the solution is in the soul, they
are not able to define properly what the knowledge of virtue is.
Plato’s contrast in the Phaedo between the appearances of the world and the
reality of ideas places the question of self-knowledge in the purification (καθάρσις)
and the exercise of recollection. To know oneself is to separate from the body in
order to contemplate the inner ideas of beauty, goodness and truth. When we look
into inside we find something more real and valuable as the appearances of the
world. The real “i” is the rational soul that contemplates the inner truths in the exer-
cise of recollection. Plato’s doctrine of knowledge as recollection seems to be a
solution not only for theoretical issues, but also for ethical knowledge. To the ques-
tion “what kind of knowledge is present in virtue?” Plato could say that it is a
knowledge of the pure ideas of justice, beauty and goodness the soul finds when it
looks into itself. This knowledge, on the other hand, comes only in the way the soul
comes through a process of καθάρσις from the appearances of the world.
Plato’s tripartition of the soul in the Republic shows that self-knowledge comes
when the rational part controls and commands his appetitive desires and emotions.
Self-knowledge is a process of education in which one is able to look into himself
and see the Good, and then introduce a rational order into his own soul and in the
city. Only the person that is able to introduce that order would be aware of his own
position towards reality. Self-knowledge is above all a process of self-freedom and
self-control.
Plato’s philosophy can be understood as a development of the concept of σοφία,
wisdom, taken as a practical and theoretical attitude towards what is really valuable
in life45. This σοφία is a process of self-knowledge which appears in his first dia-
logues as a sort of τέχνη, it is then explained as an exercise of recollection and
καθάρσις, and it is developed in the Republic as a process of education in which the
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45 “L’apparition de la figure du sage corresponde à une prise de conscience de plus en plus aiguë du
moi, de la personnalité, de l’interiorité. Ce mouvement de prise de conscience est inauguré par la for-
mule socratique: «Prends souci de toi-même», qui révèle à l’individu qu’il peut diriger sa vie, que son
moi a une valeur propre, qui est aussi importante pour la Cité tout entière. […] Le sage est précisé-
ment celui qui a su conquérir cette liberté intérieure, cette liberté de penser selon la norme de la
raison, de la nature, qui peut s’opposer aussi bien aux opinions, aux prejuges, aux impératifs de la
Cité qu’aux caprices du désir et de la passion”. Hadot, P.: “La figure du sage”, Études de philosophie
ancienne, Les belles lettres, Paris, 1998, p. 247.
learner must acquire an inner disposition towards the Good, ruling his soul accord-
ing to his rational part. The σοφός is the person who knows his own limits and is
able to apprehend the Good and introduce a rational order in his life46. i have tried
to point out that self-knowledge for Plato does not consist in a theoretic act of self-
apprehension, but rather is a process of self-discovering in relation to the world and
what is really valuable. in this sense, self-knowledge doesn’t come in a direct act of
self-comprehension, but rather as an indirect awareness of our own position towards
what is most real: Good, Beauty and Truth.
But, on the other hand, self-knowledge is not only a question of contemplation,
but also of practice. We know ourselves inasmuch as we introduce a practical order
in our lives that gives place to contemplation. That is, as far as i can see, what we
can learn about self-knowledge (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) in the Platonic dialogues and one
of the keys that allows us to understand his thought.
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46 in Plato’s doctrine of Forms we found not only an epistemic or metaphysic theory, but also a solid
foundation for his ethics in which theory and practice go hand in hand. See Kahn, C.: “The Motivation
for Plato’s Doctrine of Forms”, Dialogues on Plato’s Republic, n. notomi-L. Brisson (eds.),
Academia, Sankt Agustin, 2013, pp. 223-232.
